University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2004

Deliberative Democracy: An Empirical Note
Richard A. Posner

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard A. Posner, Response, "Deliberative Democracy: An Empirical Note", 3 Election Law Journal 698
(2004).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

5214_09_p698-701

10/19/04

9:28 AM

Page 698

ELECTION LAW JOURNAL
Volume 3, Number 4, 2004
© Mary Ann Liebert, Inc.

Response to Review
Deliberative Democracy: An Empirical Note
RICHARD A. POSNER

T

to comment on
Richard Pildes’s review of my recent book
on legal pragmatism and democratic theory.1
Pildes’s review has a twofold focus: (1) the contrast that I emphasize between deliberative
democracy and the Schumpeterian concept of
democracy, which is usually called “elite”
democracy, though a better term is “competitive” democracy; and (2) the unfortunate preoccupation of legal scholars with what Pildes
calls “rights-oriented democracy.” He points
out that neither the advocates of deliberative
democracy nor the rights-oriented theorists express much interest in or insight into the actual
workings of a democratic political system. The
former want a quite different system, in which
reasoning to consensus would displace the
unedifying power struggles that characterize
real-world politics, while the latter insist on the
vindication of abstractly stated rights, such as
“one man, one vote,” regardless of the realworld consequences. The fiasco of the 2000
Presidential election stimulated some interest
in legal academic circles in the actual operation
of the democratic process—indeed, it is what
first got me thinking about democratic theory—but democracy continues to be a surprisingly neglected subject in the nation’s law
schools.
Pildes, a leader in the field, is distressed by
HE EDITORS HAVE INVITED ME

Richard A. Posner is Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit and Senior Lecturer, University of
Chicago Law School. He thanks Amanda Butler, Nicole
Eitmann, Phil Kenny, Paul Ma, and Liss Palamkunnel for
their very helpful research assistance, and William Landes for his helpful suggestions.

this neglect, and he agrees with me that competitive democracy provides a better description of our actual existing political system and
therefore a better starting point for the analysis of suggested reforms. He blurs the message
a bit, by emphasizing more than I would the
overlap (which I acknowledged in my book)
between deliberative and competitive democracy; despite the overlap, the differences in tone
and orientation are profound. Pildes would like
me to have devoted greater attention to specific
reforms, but this would not have been practicable; the book was already quite long, and, unlike him, I am not a specialist in election law or
the design of political institutions. My aim was
modest: to expound a systematic version of
Schumpeter’s theory (Schumpeter himself had
merely sketched the theory) and, in part
through such exposition and in part through a
critique of competing approaches, to persuade
readers of the superiority of the Schumpeterian approach to the other approaches on offer,
both as positive and as normative analysis.
Pildes expresses frustration at my use of the
term “pragmatic,” which he claims I attach to
anything that “people like him [i.e., Posner]
know and believe.”2 He illustrates with my
statement that “pragmatists are not impressed”
by arguments for populist democracy. That is
not quite what I said; and the difference be-

1Richard

H. Pildes, “Competitive, Deliberative, and
Rights-Oriented Democracy,” 3 Election Law Journal 685
(2004), reviewing Richard A. Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and
Democracy (2003).
2Pildes, note 1 above, at 695.
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tween what I said and what he says I said,
though small, is significant. The statement
“pragmatists are not impressed” follows the
sentence in my book in which I say that populist democracy “argues that since democracy
means rule by the people, the people are entitled to rule”; and the first reason I give for why
pragmatists are not impressed is that they “do
not see how entitlement enters the picture.”3
Pragmatism is concerned with consequences,
rather than with entitlements defended without
regard to consequences. Pildes, with his justifiable disdain for “rights-oriented democracy,”
seems to me a pragmatist in just that sense.
What is correct—but it is a point that my
book emphasizes at perhaps tedious length—
is that pragmatism has no political valence and
so cannot be used to arbitrate among suggested
reforms. The hope of the pragmatic analyst can
only be that, if the consequences of alternative
policies are well understood, there is sufficient
value consensus to enable those consequences
to dictate the choice of policy. This point I shall
now illustrate with a short empirical study.
Deliberative democrats regard the low voter
turnout characteristic of American elections as
a bad thing, a sign of the American people’s refusal to comply with its civic duty of deliberating about political questions; for if persons eligible to vote deliberated and reached a
considered conclusion, they would surely take
the time to vote. This is by no means clear; the
conclusion of their deliberations might be that
it was impossible to make a rational choice between candidates, either because of lack of information or because (a closely related point)
the candidates had such different strengths and
weaknesses that it was impossible to make a net
assessment of which candidate was superior.
But deliberative democrats thinks otherwise;
hence the Ackerman-Fishkin proposal of “Deliberation Day,”4 a national holiday that would
be scheduled shortly before each national election. On that day, registered voters would meet
in small neighborhood groups to discuss the
forthcoming election. Attendance would not be
compulsory, but anyone who did attend and
then voted would receive $150.5 Pildes describes the proposal as “grandiose . . . a quixotic
and highly contrived academic exercise.”6 I am
of the same mind. But neither Pildes nor I could

convince Fishkin or Ackerman that “Deliberation Day” was a bad idea unless perhaps we
could show that it would not increase turnout.
This would not be a conclusive argument
against the proposal, because they might
counter that those who did vote after having attended a deliberation session would vote more
intelligently. But still if there were no increase
in turnout, the case for “Deliberation Day”
would be greatly weakened, because the implication would be that the only people attending
the deliberation sessions were people who already took seriously their civic duty of political
participation—that the promise of $150 had not
lured any other people into becoming participants. So it is no surprise that Ackerman and
Fishkin do claim that “Deliberation Day” would
result in increased voter turnout.7
Their claim cannot be tested directly, because
there is no such holiday. But it can be tested indirectly by determining whether states in
which Presidential candidates are picked by
caucus rather than by primary have higher
turnouts in Presidential elections. (The number
of states in which one or both parties used caucuses to pick their Presidential candidates was
35 in 1960 but had declined to 9 by 2000.) Caucuses resemble the deliberation sessions that
Ackerman and Fishkin wish to promote. Instead of just casting a vote, the citizen meets
with other citizens before voting. If caucuses
do not increase turnout, it is unlikely that “Deliberation Day” would do so. Granted, as Ackerman and Fishkin point out, caucuses are decision sessions, rather than discussion sessions
as such, although of course discussion takes
place; and except in Iowa, only a small percentage of registered voters attend caucuses,
fewer than vote in primaries in primary states.8
These facts in themselves are telling against the

3Posner,
4Bruce

note 1 above, at 155.
Ackerman and James S. Fishkin, Deliberation Day

(2004).
5Posner, note 1 above, at 136–137 n. 15; Posner, “Smooth
Sailing,” Legal Affairs, Jan./Feb. 2004, p. 40.
6Pildes, note 1 above, at 694. Ackerman and Fishkin call
their proposal “realistic utopianism”—an oxymoron if
ever there were one. Ackerman and Fishkin, note 4 above,
at 13.
7Id. at 23, 93–94.
8Id. at 125.

5214_09_p698-701

10/19/04

9:28 AM

Page 700

700

POSNER

realism of Ackerman and Fishkin’s self-described utopian proposal. But even if there isn’t
much discussion at caucuses and most registered voters don’t attend, one might suppose
that the existence of an institutionalized opportunity for making political decisions in faceto-face meetings would have a discernible if
perhaps slight effect in the direction of that predicted for “Deliberation Day.” The leading
study of caucuses, which Ackerman and
Fishkin cite with approval, states that “caucuses are probably a more involving and educational form of participation than primary voting, though they fall well short of the strong
democratic ideals propounded by many political theorists.”9
Tables 1 and 2 present the results of a regression analysis designed to isolate the effect
of caucuses on turnout (defined as percentage
of the adult voting-age population that voted),
in each Presidential election in the period
1960–2000, from the effects of other circumstances that might be expected to influence
turnout. The other circumstances include the
state’s per capita income (inflation-adjusted),
the percentages of the state’s population that
graduated from high school and from college,
the percentage of young people (who tend not
to vote) and of old people (who tend disproTABLE 1.

REGRESSION OF VOTER TURNOUT
WITH YEAR DUMMIES

Independent variable
Income
High school
College
Age 20–24
Age 60–100
Black
Vote ratio
Caucus
1976
1980
1984
1988
1992
1996
2000
Constant

Coefficient

t-Statistic

0.000
0.512
0.013
1.932
0.516
0.207
0.035
0.240
3.270
5.845
7.935
14.359
10.469
19.339
17.019
41.131

0.86
7.14**
0.08
3.57**
3.31**
4.92**
0.81
0.35
2.52*
3.56**
4.24**
6.65**
3.58**
5.41**
3.53**
5.14**

*Significant at 5% level.
**Significant at 1% level.
No. observations  408. Prob. F  0.0000. R-squared
 0.49.

TABLE 2.
WITH

REGRESSION OF VOTER TURNOUT
YEAR AND STATE DUMMIES

Independent variable
Income
High school
College
Age 20–24
Age 60–100
Black
Vote ratio
Caucus
Constant

Coefficient

t-Statistic

0.00
0.39
0.09
1.78
0.11
0.11
0.02
0.50
50.82

0.85
3.91**
0.37
3.31**
0.35
3.22**
0.46
0.95
6.33**

No. observations  408. Prob. F  0.0000. R-squared
 0.88.

portionately to vote), the percentage of the population that is black (as they tend to undervote),
and how close the Presidential election was in
the state. Although the higher a person’s income is, the more costly it is for him or her to
vote, because the principal opportunity cost of
voting is the time it takes to vote, higher-income people are likely to be more “connected”
to society, have more leisure, have greater flexibility in the use of time, are less likely to screw
up in the voting booth and cast an invalid ballot, and are less likely to be felons or noncitizens and therefore ineligible in many states to
vote. It is unclear how these income-related
considerations balance out, and so turnout
might be either positively or negatively correlated with income. Education, however, once
income (with which education is positively
correlated) is adjusted for, should unequivocally increase turnout. The closeness of the
election might be expected to increase turnout
as well, since closer elections, like other close
contests, elicit more interest than elections
whose outcome is foreordained. (The variable
“Vote Ratio” in the tables measures the ratio
of votes for the winning candidate to the total
number of votes cast in the state; the lower the
ratio, the closer the election.) And because
voter turnout fell throughout the period covered by the analysis, year dummies are included to reflect the effect of time on turnout.

9William

G. Mayer, “Caucuses: How They Work, What
Difference They Make,” in In Pursuit of the White House:
How We Choose Our Presidential Nominees 105, 145 (William
G. Mayer, ed., 1996).
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(A dummy variable is a variable that takes a
value of 0 if it is absent and 1 if it is present.)
The caucus variable is also a dummy variable,
which takes a value of 0 if neither party in a
state uses caucuses and 1 if both do. In Table
2, state dummies are added to the variables in
Table 1 (but the year and dummy variables are
not shown), to reflect the possibility that statespecific demographic, cultural, or political factors not reflected in any of the other variables
influence turnout. The only significant effect,
besides increasing the amount of variance in
the data that the regression equation explains,
is that the age of 60 variable is no longer statistically significant.
All the independent variables have the predicted sign (remember that income does not
have a predicted sign), except the vote-ratio
variable in Table 2, and almost all are highly significant statistically. However, the variable of in-

terest—the caucus variable—is insignificant in
both tables. The equations as a whole make an
excellent fit with the data, as indicated by the
value of Prob.  F, and explain almost half the
variance in Table 1 and almost nine-tenths of it
in Table 2.10 So there is now statistical evidence
against the theory of political participation that
underlies the proposal for “Deliberation Day”
and, more broadly, that animates the beliefs of
the deliberative democracy movement.
Address correspondence to:
Richard A. Posner
E-mail: richard_posner@ca7.uscourts.gov

10Data

sources and other details of the regression analysis are posted on my University of Chicago Law School
web site, http://home.uchicago.edu/rposner/.

